Index speculation - a new challenge for world food security by Bass, Hans-Heinrich
www.ssoar.info
Index speculation - a new challenge for world food
security
Bass, Hans-Heinrich
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Sammelwerksbeitrag / collection article
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Bass, H.-H. (2012). Index speculation - a new challenge for world food security. In U. Mrzygłód (Ed.), Challenges of the
global economy (pp. 719-728). Gdansk: University of Gdansk. https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-341476
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer CC BY-NC-ND Lizenz
(Namensnennung-Nicht-kommerziell-Keine Bearbeitung) zur
Verfügung gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zu den CC-Lizenzen finden
Sie hier:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/deed.de
Terms of use:
This document is made available under a CC BY-NC-ND Licence
(Attribution-Non Comercial-NoDerivatives). For more Information
see:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
Wyzwania gospodarki globalnej
Prace i Materia³y Instytutu Handlu Zagranicznego Uniwersytetu Gdañskiego 2012, nr 31
Challenges of the global economy
Working Papers Institute of International Business University of Gdañsk 2012, no. 31                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
Hans-Heinrich Bass
Bremen University of Applied Sciences
Index speculation
– a new challenge for the world food security
In recent years, new actors from the outside the agrobusiness – the “index-oriented investors” –
have entered the grain futures markets. This activity cannot be understood without considering
the fact that prices for agricultural commodities have increased since the mid-1990s due to funda-
mental factors, both on the demand- and the supply-side. Based on this, agricultural commodities
futures have become an attractive asset class for financial investors with two characteristics: first,
they look for new asset classes the performance of which is not correlated with other asset classes;
secondly, they believe that passive portfolio-management strategies, i.e. the “replication” of the
market by distributing investments across various assets such as those being represented in popu-
lar indices, are more successful than active selection strategies. Investment in commodity futures
by index-oriented investors had been facilitated by the development of new financial instruments
(ETC, ETF). It has become ever more appealing as a result of falling returns on investment for tra-
ditional financial investments, such as the government bonds. However, the unconditional de-
mand exerted by index-oriented investors on futures markets does not only lead to the
reinforcement of the upward price trend on the spot market but also contributes to the emergence
of short-term price bubbles (2008 and 2010/11).
Spekulacja indeksem
– nowe wyzwanie dla œwiatowego bezpieczeñstwa ¿ywnoœciowego
W ostatnich latach na rynku kontraktów futures na zbo¿e pojawili siê nowi inwestorzy spoza sek-
tora agrobiznesu – „inwestorzy zorientowani na indeksy”. Nie mo¿na zrozumieæ ich dzia³alnoœci
bez uwzglêdnienia faktu, ¿e ceny towarów rolnych wzros³y od po³owy lat 90. ze wzglêdu na
czynniki fundamentalne, wystêpuj¹ce zarówno po stronie popytu, jak i poda¿y. W wyniku tych
zmian kontrakty futuresna towary rolne sta³y siê atrakcyjn¹ klas¹ aktywów dla inwestorów finan-
sowych o dwóch cechach: po pierwsze, poszukuj¹cych nowych klas aktywów, których stopa
zwrotu nie jest skorelowana z innymi instrumentami; po drugie, tych, którzy uwa¿aj¹, ¿e pasyw-
ne strategie zarz¹dzania portfelem – tj. „replikacja” rynku poprzez rozproszenie inwestycji w in-
strumenty, które zwieraj¹ siê w popularnych wskaŸnikach – s¹ bardziej skuteczne ni¿ strategie
aktywnej selekcji. Inwestycje w towarowe kontrakty futures przez podmioty „zorientowane na
indeksy” zosta³y u³atwione w wyniku rozwoju nowych instrumentów finansowych (ETC, ETF),
a w œwietle spadaj¹cych stóp zwrotu z inwestycji w tradycyjne instrumenty, takie jak obligacje
rz¹dowe, sta³y siê jeszcze bardziej atrakcyjne. Jednak bezwarunkowy wzrost popytu wœród in-
westorów zorientowanych na indeksy na rynku futures, nie tylko doprowadzi do wzmocnienia
rosn¹cej tendencji cen na rynku spot, ale tak¿e przyczyni siê do powstania krótkoterminowych
baniek spekulacyjnych (2008 i 2010/2011).
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Introduction
Between the years 2000 and 2011, world market prices for food have more
than doubled (see Figure 1). This trend results from both demand-side and
supply-side forces. The main demand-side force is the continuing growth of
world population. In the USA and Europe, there is also an increasing usage of
grain for the production of agro fuels. Furthermore, important changes in the de-
mand structure have occurred: In emerging economies, especially in China, de-
mand for meat has increased, which translates into a multiple increase in the
demand for grain as animal feed. On the other hand, growth in the world food
supply has slowed in comparison to the heyday of the Green Revolution in the
1960s/1970s. The reasons include diminishing marginal returns of inputs in agro-
industry, the widespread neglect of subsistence agriculture in Sub-Saharan Africa,
and the increasing usage of land for the cultivation of non-food commodities such
as cotton, or for housing and infrastructure. In addition to these “fundamental” fac-
tors, speculation on markets for wheat, corn, and soy has been blamed for contribut-
ing to soaring food prices, especially during price peaks in 2008 and 2010/2011.
Food speculation is by no means a new phenomenon. Already in the biblical
times, there was a mention of the speculator “who withholds corn” – obviously in
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Index: 2000=100 real 2000$ (from 03/2011 onwards: 2005=100, nominal $).
Figure 1. Index of World Food Prices, Monthly Data 1/1990 to 3/2012
Data source: World dataBank, Global Economic Monitor (GEM) Commodities, http://databank.world-
bank.org/ ddp/home.do; own design.
the hope of rising prices but much to the indignation of his fellow human beings
[Proverbs 11.26]. As harvest results are not predictable at the point of sowing, in
a market-based economy all participants in the grain trade have always been look-
ing for ways and means to reduce the risk of adverse price changes. The most vi-
able option is to agree upon guaranteed prices for future deliveries. This is the
very essence of trading on the forward market – a commercial invention ascribed
to ancient Greek mathematician, Thales of Miletus. The institution of grain futures
exchanges was introduced as early as in the seventeenth century in Japan.
Since today’s farmers, wholesalers, manufacturers, and financial institutions
alike endeavor to anticipate price movements in their economic activities, specu-
lating is not only a very old, but also a ubiquitous phenomenon on the food mar-
ket – at least if we understand it in the way defined by John Maynard Keynes – as
“forecasting the psychology of the market” [Keynes, 1936, p. 161].
1. Conventional speculation in agricultural commodities
While trade on spot markets is in physically existing commodities with an im-
mediate delivery of and payment for the product, trade on forward markets is in
rights to deliver or take delivery of commodities at guaranteed prices at a later
point in time. Deals on the forward market may be either standardized or non-
standardized. Contracts tailored to the volume and date of delivery (“forwards”)
are agreed upon directly or via intermediaries between sellers and buyers and
may be resold at any time before maturity. In this segment of the market – the
“over the counter” trade (OTC) – the actual delivery of a commodity at a contract’s
maturity is no exception [Maslakovic, 2008]. In contrast, none of the market par-
ticipants trading standardized contracts (“futures”) on commodity futures ex-
changes is interested in the actual delivery of the commodity. Financial settlement
is only required to make up for the difference between the price previously agreed
upon and the actual spot market price at the time of the contract’s maturity.
If a trader expects spot-market prices to rise, he will buy contracts today that
guarantee him at the contract’s maturity a supply at a lower price than the price he
is expecting – he is entering a “long position”. Vice versa, if he is expecting falling
spot market prices, he will enter contracts guaranteeing him a higher than ex-
pected purchasing price for what he agrees to supply. He is entering a “short posi-
tion”. Whoever better predicts the “psychology of the market”, will pocket
a profit. This is why we may call these deals betting. If, for instance, Trader A has
purchased the right to be supplied with a ton of wheat at 100 dollars, while the ac-
tual spot market price at the contract’s maturity turns out to be 110 dollars, Trader
A is entitled to receive a payment of 10 dollars from the contract partner Trader B.
In order to really deliver, Trader B would have to purchase the wheat at 110 dol-
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lars on the spot market and sell it to Trader A at 100 dollars, which results in Trader
B’s loss of 10 dollars – equivalent to Trader B’s cash settlement obligation. In this
example, Trader A has won his bet.
Based on the motives for their transactions, two categories of conventional
market participants can be distinguished on the forward market: hedgers (rooted
in the food industry, thus also called commercial traders) and conventional finan-
cial speculators including arbitrageurs. Market participants from the food indus-
try, either large producers or manufacturers, want to hedge risks from adverse
spot-market price movements for their future physical deliveries and purchases.
Conventional financial speculators, on the other hand, are attracted to the futures
market by the prospects of profits in a game based on information, rumors, and
calculations.
Participants from both groups may hold net long positions or net short posi-
tions, based on their respective hopes and fears. However, as a group the hedgers
usually hold net short positions, while the conventional speculators as a group
usually hold net long positions. The conventional finance-industry speculators
thus usually contribute to the functioning of the market by providing the neces-
sary liquidity when taking the counter-positions to the hedgers. If, for instance,
a farmer seeks to enter a short position at a given price, the deal will only work if
someone else, no matter whether a manufacturer or a finance institution, enters
a long position.
A particular sub-group within the conventional speculators is the group of ar-
bitrageurs. Their strategy is to take advantage of minute price differentials be-
tween different futures exchanges (such as between Chicago and exchanges in
Kansas City, Paris, or Dalian) or between futures of different maturities. As such,
arbitrageurs perform an important role of integrating different markets, thus con-
tributing to the efficiency of the system as a whole.
It is self-evident that the high risk-taking behavior as well as herd behavior
among these market participants can trigger strong fluctuations of prices, includ-
ing extreme peaks. Also, price bubbles are possible, i. e. market situations in which
“the price of an asset rises [for some time] above what appears to be its fundamen-
tal value” [Mankiw, 2012, p. 590] – the latter usually understood to be a sort of av-
erage or normal value derived from “real” demand and supply factors. The
development of a price bubble has to be understood as a self-enforcing process:
for whatever reason, contracts are increasingly bought, which results in price in-
creases and hence in potential profits from the futures that have already been
taken into a trader’s portfolio – which, in turn, attracts further buyers. As long as
buyers can be found to join the bandwagon, the price of the future will continue to
increase – until suspicion arises and somebody begins to sell and the crash sets in.
Such developments are probably the price that an economic system has to pay
for the provision of financial market-based insurance against possible losses
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among the farmers. The participation of financial speculators in this market en-
sures the readiness of commercial farmers to produce food under essentially un-
predictable conditions. The alternative would be a planned economy with price
guarantees for the producers given by the state, as was the case for instance in the
European Economic Community (EEC) grain market regulations of the 1960s.
Very recently, however, a third category of market participants has emerged
on the futures exchange – the index investors, suspected of additionally pushing
the upward trend of world food prices. Readers of crime novels know that once
a new suspect appears on the stage, his motive and opportunities have to be inves-
tigated. Therefore, the next section will deal with the motives which the index
speculators drive to engage in activities on the grain futures markets and whether
they are capable of influencing food prices on the spot market.
2. A new dimension of speculation: Index investment
Index-oriented financial investors distribute their investment among different
classes of assets that are weighted in analogy to an index which describes price de-
velopments for a group or a sub-group of commodities with certain weights (for
instance equal-weighted or according to their relevance in world trade). Index in-
vestors keep futures on different commodities in their portfolio according to the
weights used in the index. When contracts reach maturity, they are sold in order
to avoid actual delivery, but new contracts are then purchased in roughly the
same volume to be represented in the portfolio according to the pre-defined pro-
portion – fairly insensitive to actual prices or market rumors. This process of swap-
ping near-to-mature contracts for contracts due to be settled later is called
“rolling”.
2.1. Motives of index-oriented investors
What are the motives of the index-oriented investors? First, as has been expli-
cated in the first section of this paper, demand for grain is growing worldwide,
and the expansion of production can hardly keep pace with an increase in de-
mand. Since the mid-1990s world-market prices have been increasing and this
trend is set to continue over the next few years. Thus, it makes sense for investors
to have assets in their portfolio that are going to increase in value in the medium
term. However, since no financial investor wishes to store grain, they do not en-
gage on the spot markets but on the futures exchanges with rolling contracts
(while in the case of precious metals financial investors may actually wish to own
warehouse stocks).
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Second, since the times of Harry Markowitz [Markowitz, 1952] it is common
knowledge that investors should not put all their eggs into one basket. Rather it
can be shown mathematically that the total profit is maximized if assets are diver-
sified in a way that the profits and losses from the individual asset classes develop
independently of one another. In empirical studies [most influential: Gorton and
Rouwenhorst 2005], it has been demonstrated that this applies to investment in
commodities in relation to stocks or government bonds.
Third, most investors have become convinced that in the long run no single
investor is smarter than the collective intelligence of all market participants – “the
market”. This means that no fund manager will be able to consistently outperform
the average performance of an asset class by investing in particularly promising
assets. Owing to its non-selective behaviour, this investment strategy is referred to
as the random-walk strategy [Malkiel, 1973]. Therefore, instead of an active fund
management or stock picking, a passive replication of the market developments
has been more and more often recommended – such as keeping shares in one’s
portfolio according to their weight in an index.
2.2. Opportunity and feasibility of index-oriented investments
The Index-oriented investor behavior has been made possible through the
creation of new investment instruments in the course of the worldwide liberaliza-
tion of the financial markets: Exchange Traded Commodities (since 2006), Ex-
change Traded Funds (since 1993), and commodity-based Investment Certificates
(since the 1990s). With these instruments, capital can be accumulated and
invested in commodity markets, either by the funds themselves or by the financial
market actors who have specialized in trading risks of different classes – the swap
traders (previously considered a sub-category of conventional speculators but
more recently considered a sub-category of those applying an index-oriented in-
vestment strategy).
Index-oriented investment behavior has become feasible as a global savings
(or: liquidity) glut [Bernanke, 2007; see also Bracke, Fidora, 2008] has emerged
since the turn of the millennium in both the high-income countries and emerging
economies such as China. As, during the last decade, low-risk government bonds
have hardly performed above the rate of inflation, large and small investors alike
have looked for more profitable investment options, and an increasing amount of
money has been directed to index speculation. Moreover, in the wake of the 2009
financial crisis and the 2011 Eurozone crisis, the global market has been flooded by
central-bank money available virtually free of charge – mainly to restore inter-
bank lending. Financial investors, however, have been seeking profitable invest-
ments for this easily available money. In addition to nourishing a new bubble on
the stock market, a flight into tangible assets such as metals and real estate had set
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in. This again constitutes a self-fulfilling prophecy: for not only can rising com-
modity prices result in a monetary inflation, but they can also lead to deteriorating
profits from commodity-processing manufacturing industries. Thus, incentives
arise to redeploy capital to financial investment in commodities (futures or, in the
case of metals: real stocks1), the price of which in turn continues to rise.
2.3. Volume of index-oriented investments
Data collected in Chicago, the world’s largest food commodity futures ex-
change, offer some insight into the size of the transactions of different groups of
traders – even if the data collection still exhibits methodological shortcomings and
has only recently (June 2006) become reasonably comprehensive. According to
these data, each of the three groups accounts for roughly one third of the market
volume in grain futures (see Figure 2).
By definition, the net values of all groups cancel each other out since there is
a corresponding short position on the market for each long position that has been
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Figure 2. Net positions in corn (maize) futures (à 5,000 bushel) held by different groups
of traders, Chicago Board of Trade, January 2006 to August 2011 (weekly data)
Source: Hans-Heinrich Bass, The relevance of speculation, Rural 21, 05/2011, pp. 17–21, http://www.ru-
ral21_com/uploads/media/rural_2011_5_17-21.pdf.
1 In the case of food, “land grabbing”, i.e. the seizure of land in developing countries by private or
public funds from emerging economies can be considered an equivalent to financial investment in real
stocks [Wohlmuth, 2012].
entered. The counter-position to the hedgers (who, by definition, also hold physi-
cal stocks or wish to purchase them, the price of which they are hedging by trad-
ing in futures) is assumed by traditional speculators and index speculators. While
the hedgers and the traditional speculators are mirror images of one another (and
both sides could trade with reversed signs in net values, see data for early 2009 in
Figure 2) and their positions are also subject to severe fluctuations, the index
speculators maintain a virtually constant, high net long position. The average of
400,000 corn (maize) futures (á 5,000 bushel; 25 kg per bushel) hold by index
speculators in Chicago alone represents about 6 per cent of a world harvest of
800+ million tons [Bass, 2011b].
2.4. Impacts of index-oriented investments
Academic and policy-oriented research has only recently begun to analyze the
impact of index-oriented investment on price formation on spot markets (for the
first, albeit partisan overview see Meijerink and Shutes 2012). While some authors,
both dissidents from the financial industry and scientists in the UN- and World
Bank system, see very strong statistical links [e.g. Masters, 2008; UNCTAD, 2008;
Robles, Torero, von Braun, 2009; Baffes, Haniotis, 2010], others, including authors
from the OECD and the IMF, do not see any links at all [e.g. Antoshin, Samiei 2006;
Irwin, Sanders 2010].
According to our understanding [Bass, 2011b], the links are established via the
rolling process and the activities of the arbitrageurs. Whenever the contracts in
their portfolio reach maturity, they have to purchase new ones. This is, of course,
beneficial to the commercial trader since he has better chances to hedge against
falling prices. If prices on the spot market fall, the hedger will nevertheless receive
the higher guarantee price, while the index trader takes the loss. On the other
hand, if the spot market price rises, the index trader will have won the bet, and the
hedger will pay the insurance premium equivalent. Obviously, the index inves-
tor’s strategy can only work if commodity prices continue to rise more often than
they fall, i.e. if they are following an upward trend – as they have done over the
past ten years.
The conventional speculators enter both short and long positions and can
thus reinforce both price fluctuations and price bubbles on the futures market –
but not the trend. Leaving aside smaller portfolio corrections, the index specula-
tors, on the other hand, only enter long positions and enforce both an already ex-
isting upward trend in prices as well as an emerging bubble, but not volatility – as
more or less regardless of the price a large demand for futures exists to maintain
the prescribed proportion of assets in the portfolio.
An upward trend on the futures market is transmitted to the spot market by
the activity of the arbitrageurs. The reason is obvious: with a high price for the
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next due wheat contract and a low price on the wheat spot market, an arbitrageur
could stock up on cheap wheat from the spot market and offer to fulfill his future
contract with this delivery. The spot market suppliers will anticipate this rising de-
mand and for their part increase prices.
It is this international spot market for grain where the traders from food-
importing countries replenish their supplies. With increasing international spot
market prices, their import prices will usually also increase. For many countries,
where poor people pay (as is predicted by Engels’ law) half and more of their in-
come for food, rising import prices for food can exacerbate already existing food
insecurity.
As, however, price quotation on the world market for grain is in US dollars,
import price changes may be cushioned or amplified by the development of the
value of a country’s currency. An upvaluation vis-a-vis the US dollar – such as that
experienced by the Euro-linked West and Central African CFA-Franc during the
2011 global food price bubble – helps, while other countries – such as famine-hit
Haiti and Kenya – had to accept adverse developments also from the foreign
exchange market.
Conclusion
Without political intervention, index investment on the global food market
will continue to grow in importance as the causal factors for this behavior con-
tinue to exist. Much more research is needed to fully understand the transmission
mechanism between index investment and food price formation. However, from
what we know today, it can already be concluded that index-investment is a type
of market participants’ behavior detrimental to the majority of consumers – espe-
cially those in poor, food-importing countries. As index investment in food com-
modities was made possible only by a far-reaching liberalization of the financial
markets in the 1990s, governments are well advised to re-regulate these activities
today.
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